Transparent and shielded
You will get from this page: which operations need a transparent address, exactly what a reader of the chain can and cannot see, and what the shielded pool does to an asset that enters it.
This is the page to read before any other. Almost everything that surprises people about these assets follows from one fact: the protocols are built on public data, so they can only be derived from public activity.
Plain language
Section titled “Plain language”Zcash has two kinds of value. Transparent value works like Bitcoin: addresses, amounts, and transactions are public. Shielded value is hidden by cryptography, so the chain proves the money moved correctly without revealing addresses or amounts.
Zordinals and ZRUNES use only the transparent side. Content, addresses, balances, and activity are publicly visible, forever. Nothing in this product makes your on-chain activity private, and nothing here is an alternative to a shielded wallet.
What a reader of the chain can see
Section titled “What a reader of the chain can see”Every protocol record on this site is derived from a part of the transaction that is public by construction. Nothing is derived from a shielded bundle, because nothing in a shielded bundle can be read without the viewing key that only its owner holds.
| Part of a transaction | Readable | What is derived from it |
|---|---|---|
| Input scripts | Yes | Zordinal envelopes: content type, content pieces, and the v1 commitment |
| Output scripts | Yes | the owning address, the value, and which output an asset moves to |
The OP_RETURN data output | Yes | the ZRunestone: etch, mint, and transfer instructions |
| Sapling spends and outputs | No | nothing |
| Orchard actions | No | nothing |
| Ironwood actions | No | nothing |
| The fee | Yes, always | fee reporting, for shielded and transparent transactions alike |
The fee row is not a rounding error, and it is the one thing people consistently get wrong. A shielded Zcash transaction hides its sender, its recipient, the amount transferred, and its memo. It does not hide the fee it paid, because the fee is the value left over in the transparent transaction value pool, and every term of that sum is public.
Shielded memo protocols do exist on Zcash. ZINC is one. They are not read here, because reading them would require holding other people’s viewing keys. They are accounted for in one way only: the ZRunes marker was chosen so that it cannot collide with them.
Which operations need a transparent address
Section titled “Which operations need a transparent address”| Operation | Transparent address required | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Receiving an inscription | Yes, the destination | the Zordinal attaches to a transparent output |
| Inscribing a Zordinal | Yes, the destination | as above |
| Etching, minting, or transferring a ZRune | Yes | ZRunes exist only on transparent outputs |
| Minting a ZRC-20 token | Yes | a mint with no transparent recipient is rejected outright |
| Transferring a ZRC-20 balance | Yes | a transfer inscription with no transparent holder is rejected outright |
| Holding any asset here | Yes | ownership is control of one transparent output |
| Paying for an order | No | funds may arrive from anywhere, including a shielded wallet or an exchange |
The last row is the only genuine exception, and it is a useful one. Only the destination has to be transparent. Where you pay from is your business, and paying from a shielded wallet is a reasonable choice if the source of your funds matters to you. See Pay with any wallet.
Which addresses are accepted
Section titled “Which addresses are accepted”| Address form | Usual prefix | Accepted as a destination |
|---|---|---|
| Transparent, pay to public key hash | t1 | Yes |
| Transparent, pay to script hash | t3 | Yes |
| Unified address containing a transparent receiver | u1 | Yes, once the transparent receiver has been extracted and verified |
| Unified address with no transparent receiver | u1 | No |
| Shielded Sapling address | zs1 | No |
A shielded-only recipient is rejected before any transaction is built, rather than accepted and then failing on the chain. The check is not a pattern match on the text: a transparent address is decoded with Base58Check, verified against the network’s own P2PKH and P2SH version bytes, and required to carry a payload of exactly twenty-two bytes. A unified address is decoded in full, through Bech32m, F4Jumble, and the receiver list, because a receiver set is jumbled precisely so that a partially checked string cannot be altered quietly. Anything that fails a rule is rejected rather than repaired.
What happens when an asset-bearing output is spent
Section titled “What happens when an asset-bearing output is spent”Three outcomes, decided by the transaction itself. There is no discretion anywhere in this: two independent indexers reach the same answer for every transaction.
Read the first question carefully, because it is the one that protects you. A transaction can carry a shielded bundle and still move an asset normally. Shielding only ends tracking when the transaction leaves the asset with nowhere transparent to go.
What shielding does to an asset
Section titled “What shielding does to an asset”Shielding does not make an asset private. It ends its trackability.
- If an inscription-bearing output is spent with no transparent successor and the transaction has a shielded component, the inscription enters the terminal state shielded, untrackable. It provably existed, its provenance up to that transaction remains verifiable, and no owner can ever be named again. The product displays this state plainly, with its own colour and its own broken-outline chip, and never guesses a shielded owner.
- If ZRune-bearing value goes shielded with no transparent successor, the balance is burned by protocol rule. It does not wait in the shielded pool; it is gone.
- A ZRC-20 amount settled into a shielded transaction is counted in its own
shielded bucket, kept apart from circulating and burned, so that
either accounting can be derived exactly rather than one being chosen for
you. The supply identity the indexer enforces is
minted = circulating + burned + shielded.
Unshielding later does not undo any of it. Tracking that has ended stays ended, and returning value never resurrects an untrackable Zordinal.
What you will and will not see
Section titled “What you will and will not see”This is the part most Zcash explorers get wrong, so it is worth being precise about what the product does instead.
- The artifact is not hidden and not deleted. An untrackable Zordinal keeps its page. That page shows the complete provenance chain, then the shielding transaction, then the terminal state. It is a fact with a transaction behind it, not a gap.
- No owner is shown, and none is guessed. There is no “unknown holder” placeholder standing in for a real address.
- A transparent address page covers transparent activity only, and says so on the page rather than implying it is a complete picture of that person’s holdings.
- A shielded or unified address is answered honestly, not with an error. Ask the public API about one and it replies successfully, reports the address as not publicly observable, returns no balance, no outputs and no transaction history, and states that this activity cannot be observed without viewing keys. An empty answer that means “not observable” is never dressed up as an answer that means “nothing here”.
- An empty result during a scan means “not found yet”, never “does not exist”. Every response carries how far the chain has been read. See What an empty result means.
How often this actually happens
Section titled “How often this actually happens”Often enough that it is not a footnote. In the indexer’s compatibility measurement of 30 August 2026, taken at scanned height 3,465,610, 15,388 of the 112,814 indexed inscriptions were already in the shielded terminal state. That is roughly one in seven.
Those figures are a single dated measurement rather than a live counter. The current numbers are the ones the explorer and the public API report, and both publish the height they were read at.
A concrete example
Section titled “A concrete example”An owner spends the output carrying inscription No. 087871 into a shielded pool, leaving no transparent output behind. From that block on, the artifact’s page shows its complete history, then the shielding transaction, then the state shielded, untrackable. If someone later unshields the same amount of ZEC, nothing connects it to the inscription; the protocol never re-attaches tracking, and neither does the product.
Safety boundary
Section titled “Safety boundary”If you need financial privacy on Zcash, use shielded ZEC through a shielded wallet, and keep that activity separate from your artifact activity. Do not shield an asset-bearing output expecting to get the asset back.
Two habits follow from everything above:
- Keep artifact addresses separate from spending addresses, so an ordinary payment can never select an asset-bearing output as change.
- Check what an output carries before you spend it. One output can carry hundreds of inscriptions, and they all move together.
Technical detail
Section titled “Technical detail”The exact conditions distinguishing a move, a burn, and a shielded terminal
state are normative:
Zordinals v1 defines
SHIELDED_UNTRACKABLE and BURNED;
ZRunes v1 defines when a
balance burns. Both are deterministic: two independent indexers reach the
same answer for every transaction.
The reasoning for building on transparent data in the first place, including why per-unit tracking of the kind used on Bitcoin cannot be made deterministic on Zcash, is set out in The ordinality decision.